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Abstract 
The volume of internet traffic on social media grows exponentially.  Exploring this 
phenomenon from a behavioural perspective, it is evident that the law can only play a 
marginal role in its regulation. The gap between no regulation and the reach of the criminal 
law is significant, made higher following the publication of guidance from the Director of 
Public Prosecutions on prosecuting social media cases. Additionally, the civil law is 
incapable of filling this gap in part due to the need for individual action and the impetus 
required to pursue it. Whilst recognising that the law will inevitably continue to play a 
marginal role in the regulation of social media, it is argued that the creation of a new tort 
enforced by a suitable body might go at least some way to deal with inappropriate postings 
falling short of the criminal law standard but justifying some legal intervention.  
Keywords: 
Social media, oversharing, legal liability, regulation, guidelines, reform  
Introduction 
Online abuse or abusive behaviour involving social media can take a variety of forms
1
.  It is a 
growing phenomenon that has become punctuated by an increase in charges and convictions 
brought against users of social media
2
.   This article focuses on two particular aspects of 
online abuse : the publication of menacing communications
3
 and those that, although of a 
trivial nature, infringe privacy.  It does so in order to explore the development of these types 
of online abuse, highlighting the ease with which communicators may cause harm and the 
avenues of legal redress (both criminal and civil) that are potentially available to victims of 
                                                          
1
 There are several forms of online abuse, the criminal sanction of which is recognised in guidelines provided by 
the UK’s Director of Public Prosecutions.  These have been updated and are currently available at  
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/communications_sent_via_social_media/index.html#content (last accessed 
2 April  2015).  
2
 “Careless Whispers: How speech is policed by outdated communications legislation”  
Big Brother Watch report, February 2015, 5, available at http://www.bigbrotherwatch.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/Careless-Whisper.pdf (last accessed 2 April 2015). 
3
 Captured under s 127 Communications Act 2003. 
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unsavoury communications
4
.  In so doing, the authors explore the utility of the legal 
environment in this context arguing that there ought to be a review of how social media law 
operates. The article therefore begins by applying behavioural analysis in order to develop an 
overview of the reasons why individuals choose to communicate online before exploring the 
consequences of this oversharing
5
 in terms of the ensuing online abuse. To this end, the 
article highlights the mismatch between the way in which people behave online and the law 
regulating that behaviour. The argument is made that, in the absence of clearly defined 
indicators, the law as currently developed is, and will remain, ill-judged, ineffective and 
confusing.  Following this, some ideas for improvement are put forward.   
Overview 
Why do people communicate so extensively online?  
According to a recent report from the House of Lords Select Committee on Communications, 
1.2 billion people regularly use Facebook, 34 million of them in the UK; 255 million 
regularly use Twitter, 15 million of them in the UK
6
.  It is, therefore, unsurprising that hardly 
a week goes by without media reports of some controversy generated by postings on Twitter, 
Facebook or other social media or blogs.  This may not necessarily be a new phenomenon: as 
Solove has commented, “from the dawn of time, people have … shamed others” 7.  On the 
internet, however, these social practices and their consequences have taken on new 
dimensions.   
 
Nonetheless, individuals continue to communicate images, thoughts and personal information 
about themselves and others online.  This begs the question of why users of social media 
appear to be naïve about the repercussions of their online footprints and hence fail to 
appreciate the potential liability to which they expose themselves. Five principal explanations 
for this may be identified.  The first involves a lack of informed knowledge. Jarvis argues that 
individuals may be agreeable to revealing information online because they do not know what 
                                                          
4
 In this piece, “unsavoury communications”, “unwise communications”, and “undesirable behaviours” and  are 
synonymous with “online abuse”.   
5
 By “oversharing”, we mean the habit, particularly among young people, of sharing, online, details of their 
everyday life : See J. Palfrey and U. Gasser, “Born Digital: Understanding the First Generation of Digital 
Natives” (Basic Books, 2008), at page 26. 
6
 House of Lords Select Committee on Communications 1
st
 Report of Session 2014-15, Social media and 
criminal offences, HL paper 37, TSO 2014, at p.7. 
7
 D. Solove, The Future of Reputation: Gossip, Rumor and Privacy on the Internet (Yale University Press, 
2007) at p.11. 
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it adds up to
8
.  It is questionable, for example, how many people know about or have ever 
read the Information Commissioners’ recommendations regarding safe sharing practices9 or 
are familiar with the myriad of regulations that might apply to their online footprints or even 
think about the consequences of their postings
10
.  Such individuals are, therefore, lacking in 
crucial knowledge relating to the consequences they may expose themselves to, both at 
criminal and civil law, to say nothing of the potential that they themselves may become 
victims of unlawful behaviour online.  Given the increased affordability, capacity and usage 
of digital and mobile technology, teenagers, for example, regularly communicate online.  In 
particular, teenage users of Social Networking Sites (SNSs) have been identified as being 
unaware or ignorant of the public nature of the content they share online
11
. The decision to 
post a communication might not, therefore, always be a truly educated one and it is this that 
has allowed some users to adopt an almost wild abandon when circulating material on the 
internet.  
 
A second reason lies in the fulfilment of online goals, in that people may choose to 
communicate online as a direct consequence of the fact that internet usage offers advantages 
and gratifications that appear to increase in direct proportion to the degree of self-
disclosure
12
.    Accordingly, online communicators appear willing to reveal their innermost 
selves to fulfil these online goals, fully
 
reaping the benefits that technological tools have 
made possible
13
.   In this way, information is effectively “exchanged as currency”14 being 
readily traded in exchange for the latest technological service.  This proposition is reinforced 
by the observation that many of the core features of communicating via SNSs, for example, 
are explicitly designed to facilitate the formation and maintenance of connections amongst 
users – connections that are sustained through communication about the self15. 
                                                          
8
 J. Jarvis, Public Parts : How sharing in the digital age improves the way we work and live (Simon and 
Schuster, 2011) at p.100. 
9
 Information Commissioner’s Office, Personal information online code of practice, 2010. Available at 
https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1591/personal_information_online_cop.pdf 
(last accessed 2 April 2015). 
10
 See below. 
11
 N. Ellison et al, ‘Negotiating Privacy Concerns and Social Capital Needs in a Social Media Environment’ in 
S. Trepte and L. Reinecke (eds), Privacy Online : Perspectives on Privacy and Self-Disclosure in the Social 
Web (Springer, 2011) at p.23. 
12
 B. Walther “Introduction to Privacy Online” in Trepte and Reinecke, op. cit., at p.7. 
13
 N. Ellison et al, “Negotiating Privacy Concerns and Social Capital Needs in a Social Media Environment” in 
Trepte and Reinecke, op. cit., at p.20. 
14
 Z. Papacharissi and P. Gigson “Fifteen Minutes of Privacy: Privacy, Sociality, and Publicity on Social 
Network Sites” in Trepte and Reinecke, op. cit., at p.84. 
15
 Ellison et al, op. cit., at p.21. 
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Thirdly, some of the attraction of online communicating is afforded by a perceived promise 
of “psychological privacy”16; that is, the sense of empowerment associated with feelings of 
choice created by managing the quantity and quality of personal information that is shared 
with other users. For example, communications to SNSs, since they are, at least initially
17
, 
restricted to a distinct group of the general public, allow users to make decisions about whom 
to connect with as “friends”18.  A high level of psychological privacy therefore exists online 
since, in controlling audiences through the selection of online “friends”, users decide with 
whom to share their private information.  The psychological privacy afforded by online 
communication channels makes users more amenable to trading their private information
19
.   
 
Fourthly, the motivation for users to post frequently is driven by the informal character and 
user-friendliness of online social networking, which positively encourages users to 
communicate private information, both voluntarily and regularly
 20
. This, coupled with the 
socially active nature of people and their “natural … desire to connect with others”21 makes 
users less discriminating when divulging personal information online. The sense of intimacy 
created by being among digital “friends” may often lead to an over-sharing of information22. 
Accordingly, online communicators may not weigh up the risks of being sued by others, but, 
as the recent case involving Lord McAlpine has shown, this is unsafe territory23. 
 
                                                          
16
 S. Trepte and L. Reinecke, ‘The Social Web as a Shelter for Privacy and Authentic Living’ in Trepte and 
Reinecke, op. cit., at p.65. 
17
 Whilst “friends” represent a communicators’ intended public, this does not mean that the actual public are 
prevented from receiving the communication should it subsequently be forwarded.  See D. Boyd “Social 
network sites as Networked Publics: Affordances, Dynamics and Implications”, in Z. Papacharissi (ed), A 
Networked Self (Routledge, 2011) at p.44. 
18
 Ellison et al, op. cit., at p. 22. 
19
 This may be especially so when people are intoxicated. See “John Grisham: sentences too harsh for viewing 
child abuse images”, The Guardian, 16 October 2014,  available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/oct/16/john-grisham-prison-sentences-child-abuse-images  
 (last accessed 2 April 2015). 
20
 B. Debatin “Ethics, Privacy and Self-Restraint in Social Networking”, in Trepte and Reinecke, op. cit., at 
p.54. 
21
  G. Hogben, “Security Issues and Recommendations for Online Social Networks”, The European Network 
and Information Security Agency (ENISA), Position Paper No. 1(2007), at p.3.  Available at 
www.ifap.ru/library/book227.pdf  (last accessed 2 April 2015). 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Lord McAlpine v Bercow [2013] EWHC 1342 (QB). 
Page 5 of 21 
 
Similarly, empirical findings suggest that individuals are highly motivated to use SNSs for 
presenting themselves
24
. This may also be driven by a misplaced presumption that online 
behaviour is private and therefore users do not anticipate that information will be seen by 
countless others
25
.  In other words, perceptions of private space online may be flawed
26
.  This 
standpoint is further entrenched because of the ease by which online communicators are able 
to achieve anonymity online.  Anonymity has, of itself, become an integral feature of cyber 
culture, with online participants relying on their anonymity as “a disinhibiting factor affecting 
what people are prepared to say in this special environment”27.  Accordingly, anonymity may 
be credited with being one of the driving forces behind the popularity of SNSs and, because 
anonymity provides an opportunity for individuals to participate in society without being 
identified, and, therefore, without needing to be accountable
28
, it provides a means by which 
individuals can more easily violate the privacy of others
29
. 
 
It is contentious to suggest that users are unaware of the risks associated with social media.  
Young and Quan-Haase, for example, observe that “Users, however, are not necessarily naıve 
in their disclosure practices… users are actively engaged in guarding their data and are not 
passive...”30.  Similarly, Palfrey and Gasser suggest that the younger generation of “digital 
natives” are becoming increasingly aware of the threats associated with the use of modern 
information technologies and adjust their behaviour accordingly, such that “the habit among 
young people of sharing many of the details of their everyday life … is neither random nor 
uncontrolled.  They are … more conscious of what they are doing than they are perceived to 
be”31.  However, the authors also acknowledge that “rarely do they have in view the full 
impact of their decision to disclose…”32 Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that the facility 
for communication afforded by modern technology, particularly the ease with which 
                                                          
24
 N. Kramer and N. Hakerkamp “Online Self-Presentation: Balancing Privacy Concerns and Impression 
Construction on Social Networking Sites”, in Trepte and Reinecke, op. cit., at p.127. 
25
 B. Walther, op. cit., n.12 at p.3. 
26
 L. Edwards “Privacy and Data Protection Online: The Laws Don’t Work” in L. Edwards and C. Waelde (eds), 
Law and the Internet (3
rd
 ed., Hart Publishing, 2009), at p. 484. 
27
 Per Mackay J., Smith v ADVFN Plc [2008] EWHC 1797 (QB), at para. [15]. 
28
 K. Oqvist Virtual Shadows (British Computer Society 2009), at p.56.  See also K. Hughes, “No Reasonable 
Expectation of Anonymity” (2010) 2(2) JML169, at p.181 and E. Barendt “Bad news for bloggers” (2009) 1(2) 
JML 141, at p.144. 
29
 Solove, op. cit., n.7, at pp.140-142. 
30
 A. Young and A Quan-Haase, “Privacy Protection Strategies On Facebook”, Information, Communication & 
Society, 16:4, 2013, 479-500, 480.  See also B. Debatin, J. Lovejoy, A.Horn and B. Hughes, “Facebook and 
Online Privacy: Attitudes, Behaviors, and Unintended Consequences”, Journal of Computer-Mediated 
Communication, Volume 15, Issue 1, pages 83–108, October 2009. 
31
 J. Palfrey and U. Gasser, op. cit., at page 26-7. 
32
 Ibid, page 36. 
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communications may be sent and the possibilities for wide – even world wide – 
dissemination carry with them dangers for the unwary and unwise in choosing not only what 
they communicate but how they do so. 
 
In practice, therefore, we effectively live in a world of information overload.  However, 
whilst much of what is posted is trivial information created to encourage the nurturing of 
online relationships, it is very easy to publish material that could lead to online abuse. It 
appears that an increasing number of transgressions are being carried out using this 
medium
33
.  Nonetheless, whilst the law may penalise people if they send ill-advised 
messages, with perpetrators possibly facing court proceedings over their online behaviour, 
people send them regardless and in great number, in part due to the ease with which the 
internet and social media facilitate communications.   
 
Consequently, the law appears marginal and this begs two principal questions, which are 
addressed below, namely:- 
i. How far are the contours, customs and practices associated with online transgressions 
understood by those responsible for formulating law so as to make legal measures 
effective? and   
ii.  How might improvements in the protections afforded at law be developed going 
forward? 
 
These questions are considered below by looking firstly at the reach of criminal sanction 
following the publication of a menacing communication and secondly at civil law remedies 
following a communication that violates privacy. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
33
 The Big Brother report, op. cit., n.2, p. 10 suggests that between 1st November 2010-1st November 2013, 
there was an increase of 217% in the number of cases heard under Section 127 of the Communications Act 2003 
and Section 1 of the Malicious Communications Act 1988 (the related offence of sending letters etc. with intent 
to cause distress or anxiety, which also applies to electronic communications) involving social media users .  
See also Geach N and Haralambous N, ‘Regulating Harassment : Is the Law Fit for the Social Netwoking Age?’ 
(2009) 73(3) The Journal of Criminal Law 241. 
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Liability in law 
Criminal Law 
The Big Brother report suggests that “the social media revolution has changed the way people 
communicate with each other. Yet, whilst our communications have evolved the way crimes 
are dealt with has not … we find ourselves using archaic legislation to police modern day 
crimes.… the laws that regulate what is said on social media … are woefully out of date”34.  
It is indeed the case that this arm of law was almost entirely enacted before the intervention 
of social media and is therefore arguably actually inappropriate for the prosecution of 
offences committed using social media.   
 
Not all commentators agree that the criminal law is out of pace with technological 
development.  A recent report from the House of Lords Select Committee suggests that the 
criminal law is “generally” apposite35. Yet, despite figures suggesting that over 14,000 
alleged crimes specifically linked to social media and reported to police in 2011
36
, a total of 
only 653 people faced criminal charges in England and Wales in 2012 in connection with 
comments on Twitter or Facebook
37
.  The consequence is that there is every chance that 
offences which deserve to be prosecuted will not be, due simply to the volume of online 
traffic
38
.  Moreover, there are several clear examples that both communicators and 
prosecutors appear not to have understood the parameters necessitating punishment by the 
State, meaning that the appropriateness of the application of the criminal law may be 
challenged.  
 
This is not least because there are significant differences between the written and spoken 
word.  Although the written word has the merit of certainty as to what the actual words used 
were, it is difficult to discern matters such as tone or emphasis, which are immediately 
apparent when spoken. This has a particular resonance with regard to Chambers v DPP
39
, 
which is discussed at length as it raises a number of pertinent issues.   Chambers was due to 
fly to Belfast from Doncaster Robin Hood Airport to meet a friend. Robin Hood Airport was, 
                                                          
34
 Op. cit., n.2, p. 5. 
35
 House of Lords Select Committee on Communications, op. cit., n.6, at p.6. 
36
 K. Dowling and J. Harlow, “Tweet this.  Is it time to tame Twitter?” The Sunday Times, 5th August 2012. 
37
 B. Wheeler, “Twitter users: A guide to the law”, BBC News, 26 February 2013, available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-20782257 (last accessed 2 April 2015). 
38
 House of Lords Select Committee on Communications, op. cit., n.6, at p.20. 
39
 [2012] EWHC 2157 (Admin); [2013] 1 WLR 1833. For comment, see R. Griffiths “Social media and the 
criminal law” (2013) 24 Ent. L.R. 57.  
Page 8 of 21 
 
however, closed due to bad weather. He posted this message on Twitter: “Crap! Robin Hood 
Airport is closed. You’ve got a week and a bit to get your shit together otherwise I am 
blowing the airport sky high!” Chambers was subsequently arrested on suspicion of 
involvement in a bomb hoax. When interviewed by the police, he insisted throughout that the 
tweet was meant as a joke. He was charged under s.127 of the Communications Act 2003 of 
sending, by means of a public electronic communications network, a message of a menacing 
character.  
 
Despite his protestations that the tweet was intended as a joke and was not of a “menacing 
character” as required by the Act, he was convicted by the magistrates and unsuccessfully 
appealed to the Crown Court. A further appeal to the Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench 
Division by way of case stated was, however, successful. Giving the judgment of the court, 
Lord Judge CJ noted that there was no evidence that any of Chambers’ Twitter followers, of 
whom there were some 600, who might have read the tweet found it to be of a menacing 
character
40
. It was, however, taken seriously by airport staff and, crucially, by the police. On 
the possible restriction on free speech brought about by s.127, he observed
41
: 
 
“Satirical, or iconoclastic, or rude comment, the expression of unpopular or unfashionable 
opinion about serious or trivial matters, banter or humour, even if distasteful to some or 
painful to those subjected to it should and no doubt will continue at their customary level, 
quite undiminished by this legislation ….. Shakespeare can be quoted unbowdlerised, and 
with Edgar, the end of King Lear, they are free to speak not what they ought to say but what 
they feel.”  
 
On the meaning of “menacing”, he observed that help could not be derived from legislation 
relating to threats in other contexts. He went on to say
42
: 
 
 “….a message which cannot or is unlikely to be implemented may nevertheless create a 
sense of apprehension or fear in the person who receives or reads it. However, unless it does 
so, it is difficult to see how it can sensibly be described as a message of a menacing character. 
                                                          
40
 There was an issue raised on appeal as to whether Twitter fell within the definition of a “public electronic 
communications network” as required by s.127. The Crown Court and the Divisional Court both took the view 
that it was as it was accessible to all internet users.   
41
 At para. 28. Compare the remarks of Lord Reid in Brutus v Cozens [1973] AC 854 at p.862 and Viscount 
Dilhorne at p.865.  
42
 At para. 30. 
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So, if a person or persons who receive or read it, or may reasonably be expected to receive, or 
read it, would brush it aside as a silly joke, or a joke in bad taste, or empty bombastic or 
ridiculous banter, then it would be a contradiction in terms to describe it as a message of a 
menacing character. In short, a message which does not create fear or apprehension in those 
to whom it is communicated, or who may reasonably be expected to see it, falls outside this 
provision, for the very simple reason that the message lacks menace.”   
 
He pointed out that the meaning of a message had to be considered in both its context and 
with reference to the means by which the message was sent. He noted that the Crown Court 
had been concerned that it was sent at a time of public concern about the threat of terrorism. 
Even when examined in context, however, it did not, he thought, constitute a threat. It had 
been posted on Twitter for general reading and was not directed to any staff at the airport. He 
was of the view that the language and punctuation were inconsistent with it being a threat and 
that, in any event, it was unusual in a terrorist threat for the writer to be readily identified. 
The reaction of readers was also relevant. There was no reaction from readers at large and the 
airport staff did not take it seriously. The fact that the airport staff reported it was more a 
matter of procedure than alarm. Only when South Yorkshire Police became involved did the 
matter escalate and, even then, there was a lack of urgency in their response.   
 
The approach of the Divisional Court is surely correct in insisting that the words used must 
be examined, not in isolation, but with reference to their context and the medium through 
which the message containing them is promulgated. What it does not do, and cannot do, is to 
provide a guide as to the interpretation of any given message. This remains a matter for 
individual judgement on the part of those reading the message. 
 
The root of the problem in Chambers was the way in which his tweet was interpreted and the 
consequent decisions that were taken in respect of it. In the initial task of interpretation, the 
Lord Chief Justice urged the adoption of common sense. It is undoubtedly difficult, in some 
instances, to distinguish between the genuine threat and the attempt at humour in the written 
word. This is an exercise, though, that a range of organisations and individuals have to 
undertake on a daily basis, not least of whom are the security services. There are historical 
precedents for large scale issues of this kind. By way of example, the original prohibition on 
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sending indecent or obscene material through the post
43
 was to protect post office officials 
from exposure to such items
44
.  In the 1970s, a spate of bomb hoaxes caused not only 
legislation
45
 to attempt to deal with the phenomenon but also required the exercise of 
judgement on the part of the police, and those in places such as schools and public buildings, 
as to which were genuine threats and which were hoaxes that could safely be ignored. Major 
differences between then and now are, however, significant. The majority of the bomb threats 
or hoaxes in the 1970s were made by telephone.  Telephone calls are targeted individual 
communications addressed to a particular  person or to a representative of an organisation, 
while messages posted on social media are at large across the network and may be accessed 
by users, whether known personally to the poster or not and whether the target of the poster 
or not. The nature of the caller helped to filter the serious threat from the hoax. An Irish 
accent
46
 might suggest that the threat ought to be taken seriously, at least initially; giggling 
schoolchildren could safely be ignored.  In prose, without those sorts of indicators (which are 
not, of course, conclusive) that distinction is much more difficult to draw. Tone is particularly 
difficult to convey unless the writer is skilled, although the choice of words and punctuation 
may be indicative of that person’s intention, as Chambers illustrates.  
 
For these reasons, in Chambers, the Lord Chief Justice was of the view
47
 that the tweet was 
of a trivial nature and was inconsistent with a credible threat.  He was fortified in this 
conclusion by three other factors. First, the words were posted on Twitter, where they could 
be read by anyone
48
. Secondly, that it was unusual for a terrorist threat to enable the writer to 
be readily identified. Thirdly, that it would be difficult to imagine a serious threat that was 
accessible by a large number of people in plenty of time to enable the action threatened to be 
prevented. It is at this point, it is suggested, that the Divisional Court veered off into 
dangerous territory, for this passage contains assumptions about the way people behave. 
These assumptions may be grounded in experience but stray from the central issue of the 
meaning and import of the words actually used. Suppose a clever terrorist who decides to 
engage in a form of double bluff by using social media (having of course taken steps to 
                                                          
43
 S.4 Post Office (Protection) Act 1884. 
44
 C. Manchester, “Obscenity in the mail” [1983] Criminal Law Review 64-77, at p.65 
45
 S.51 Criminal Law Act 1977 created a series of criminal offences to deal with this phenomenon. 
46
 This was in a period in which the disputes over Northern Ireland were particularly intense with quasi-military 
groups engaging in all manner of disruptive activity, of which planting bombs was just one extreme example. 
47
 At para. 31. 
48
 It might be observed that Chambers could have saved himself a lot of bother if he had simply sent a text 
message rather than posting on Twitter. 
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ensure anonymity, though this may not matter if he is a suicide bomber) and imitating the 
language of the faux outraged would-be traveller. It is surely much safer to rely on actualities 
in order to determine the meaning and import of words than to stray outside this approach and 
rest on assumptions, however well intentioned, even as secondary fortification for a 
conclusion that has been arrived at by examination of concrete evidence.  
 
The Divisional Court did not need to go beyond its interpretation of the words used by 
Chambers to arrive at the conclusion that this was not a message of a menacing character as 
required by s.127 of the Communications Act 2003 given the medium and the way the 
message was expressed. It is unfortunate that it did so, as it may offer an invitation to courts, 
police and prosecutors in the future to use such assumptions in their analysis of 
communications: what constitutes common sense is not universally agreed.  
 
Moreover, courts and prosecutors alike need to be able to grasp contemporary discourse 
styles, irony, banter or jokes as well as the context in which a communication has been made 
so as to avoid  police, prosecutors or courts being overwhelmed with millions of trolling-type 
cases. There is already some evidence of this. In June 2014, it was reported that social media 
crimes now make up “at least half” of the calls that British police receive every day49 and 
figures suggest that, last year, 10,535 people in England and Wales were prosecuted for 
stalking and harassment, compared to 8,648 people in 2012/13
50
. However, there is no 
breakdown detailing offences committed online as against those using traditional means of 
communication.  Whilst anecdotal evidence exists as to the scale of the problem, there are 
relatively few facts.  Better statistics would help to inform the debate as to the 
appropriateness of the criminal law in relation to online transgressions
51
. 
 
There is self-evidently a role for the criminal law to play in relation to social media and other 
forms of electronic communication to distinguish between malice and joviality. This enables 
those posting tweets, such as Peter Nunn, who recently sent messages
52
 threatening to 
sexually assault MP Stella Creasy, to face due sanction. His justification for the messages he 
sent was that they were “… just a joke.  It came into my mind and I thought it was really, 
                                                          
49
 BBC News, 24 June 2014, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-27949674 (last accessed 2 April 2015). 
50
 BBC news, 11 September 2014, available at http://www.theguardian.com/law/2014/sep/11/stalking-
prosecutions-rise-new-law-cps-acpo-victim-support (last accessed 2 April 2015). 
51
 House of Lords Select Committee on Communications, op. cit., n.6 at pp.9, 19. 
52
  Including : “If you can’t threaten to rape a celebrity, what is the point in having them?”. 
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really funny”53.  Unlike Chambers, Nunn’s messages were targeted at specific individuals and 
did not lack malice. He was found guilty under Section 127 Communications Act 2003.  In a 
similar vein, criminal prosecution may well arise following the catalogue of vile internet 
abuse targeting the family of the missing child Madeleine McCann
54
. 
 
The Chambers case provoked considerable media attention, as well as wider discussion, not 
least on Twitter itself. A particular strand in the discussion was the question of whether the 
prosecution should have been brought in the first place.  The Director of Public Prosecutions 
has subsequently issued new guidance on prosecutions involving social media
55
. These 
identify four particular categories which could potentially invoke the criminal law: credible 
threats (the issue in Chambers); communications which specifically target an individual or 
individuals and fall within the Protection from Harassment Act 1997; communications in 
breach of a court order; and communications not within the previous categories but which 
may be considered grossly offensive, indecent, obscene or false and potentially falling within 
s.1 Malicious Communications Act 1988 or s.127 Communications Act 2003. The guidance 
requires that cases falling within the first three categories should be “prosecuted robustly”56 
as long as they also satisfy the general test (i.e. that there is sufficient evidence to provide a 
realistic prospect of conviction and that the prosecution is in the public interest
57
). Those in 
the fourth category, however, are to be subjected to a “high threshold”58 at the evidential 
stage. The guidance recognises that the law and the way it is used may conflict with the right 
to free speech in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It therefore 
advises that the discretion to prosecute should be exercised carefully and be based on an 
interpretation of the relevant legal provisions to ensure that complies with Article 10;
59
 so, for 
                                                          
53
 “Troll Peter Nunn guilty of MP Stella Creasy rape tweets”, BBC News, 2 September 2014.  Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-29034943 (last accessed 2 April 2015). 
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example, prosecutors are reminded that s.1 of the Malicious Communications Act 1988 
requires that an item is grossly offensive, not simply offensive. Further, in many cases, the 
guidance continues, a prosecution in such a case is unlikely to be in the public interest unless 
this is a necessary and proportionate response
60
.  The guidance further cautions that use of the 
offences contained in Part I of the Public Order Act 1986
61
 for social media cases may not be 
appropriate, as that Act is primarily concerned with words spoken or displayed in the 
presence of others
62
. Further, there is an exception where the words are spoken or displayed 
by a person within a dwelling where the potential victim is inside that or another dwelling
63
 
which is inappropriate in the context of social media.   
 
The guidelines are primarily intended for the Crown Prosecution Service. This is not, 
however, the only stage of criminal proceedings at which discretion is exercised and they will 
undoubtedly influence police practice. This is important for, as Chambers illustrates, the 
initial decision taken by the police can either bring incidents within the criminal process or 
filter them out.  
 
At what point the criminal law should be engaged is, therefore, open to legitimate debate, 
given an observed failure of courts and law makers to fully grasp contemporary discourse 
styles. Whatever conduct on social media and other electronic communications legislators 
choose to penalise, any legislation should be appropriate to the (new) media. Whilst there 
may be a desire to penalise communications in the same way through whatever medium it 
occurs, whether real or virtual, this may not always be appropriate to the different types of 
harm caused. It is also significant that, where a person is convicted of a criminal offence, 
there is not only the sentence that goes with it but also possibly more far reaching 
consequences for employment, particularly impacting on those that are subject to criminal 
record checks by the Disclosure and Barring Service.  
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The effect of all this is that the consequences of criminal sanction are potentially vast, 
particularly following the DPP’s guidelines and this may not be entirely welcome, 
particularly given that much of what is shared online is trivial, as detailed above.  The current 
state of the law in this area, therefore, suggests that lawmakers have failed to fully appreciate 
some of the conventions associated with online communications media.  Whether the civil 
law fares better is addressed below.  
 
Civil Law 
The above focused on the possible criminal law implications in sending menacing 
communications and the perceived inability of courts and, especially, prosecutors to 
accommodate contemporary discourse styles as well as to differentiate between the written 
and spoken word.   Taking an online user to task is not, however, the exclusive domain of the 
criminal law. In addition to criminal law, civil law may be invoked to deal with certain 
aspects of online communications.   
 
In respect of the civil law, online communicators may incur liability in relation to, inter alia, 
Data Protection, Intellectual Property and Defamation
64
  legislation. Aggrieved individuals 
can rely on private law to bring actions under the Data Protection Act 1998 or for misuse of 
private information65.  Since Google Spain66, it may also be possible to have a search engine 
remove a link to such data67.  
However, the emphasis for this article is misuse of private information or, put simply, the 
liability that may arise following exposing or sending private information.  In respect of this 
area of law, there is no statutory privacy legislation to call on. Whilst English law does not 
recognise a general right to privacy, there have been considerable developments in the area of 
privacy protection.  Of most significance, with the passing of the Human Rights Act 1998, a 
general right to respect for private and family life under Article 8 is incorporated into English 
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law.  In addition to Article 8, however, Article 10 provides for an explicit right to freedom of 
expression to which the courts of this country must pay appropriate respect
68
. The 
significance of this is reinforced by s.12 of the Human Rights Act, which stresses the 
particular importance of freedom of expression when journalistic, literary or artistic material 
is involved
69
. In undertaking a rigorous balancing exercise of the competing rights to privacy 
and freedom of expression, domestic courts have developed a cause of action in “misuse of 
private information”70.  Here, courts make a 2-stage assessment in consideration, firstly, of 
whether the claimant has a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of the subject matter 
in question and secondly, whether the balancing of Articles 8 and 10 comes down in favour 
of protection of this privacy or in favour of publication of the information.  When applied to 
online forums, in which, as suggested earlier, public and private boundaries have effectively 
become blurred and in which trivial information may tend to be posted, what should be 
included within the ambit of a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to online 
communications remains open to debate.  
 
Essentially, the biggest problem with civil actions in the context of online communications is 
arguably whether trivial information would ever be afforded a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. Defamation law is more developed in this regard and has differentiated “often 
uninhibited, casual and ill thought out”71  “pub talk”72 and “saloon-bar moanings”73 from 
sufficiently “serious”74 postings. However, in relation to proceedings for misuse of private 
information, the fate of the often trivial information that is posted online remains to be seen. 
In the Applause Stores case
75
, in which a user was ordered to pay damages for misuse of 
private information and for libel following the creation by him of a false profile of the 
claimant on Facebook
76
, the court determined that a person's date of birth would constitute 
information over which an individual would have a reasonable expectation of privacy. This 
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Page 16 of 21 
 
element of the judgment in particular has been criticized as being overly broad
77
 given that 
this type of information could be judged as fundamentally trivial and notwithstanding that 
birth certificates reside in the public domain.  The treatment of relatively trivial information 
therefore remains unresolved and, given the propensity to post information of this type 
online, this uncertainty is problematic and  helps to explain why the number of online misuse 
of private information cases remains small.  There have only been a handful of these cases 
brought through the court.  Therefore, whilst the effect on the victim can be as devastating, it 
remains that the reach of the civil law in relation to the online misuse of private information 
is underwhelming, ineffective and vague.  Accordingly, the role of the civil law in this 
context is somewhat remote and this lends support to the argument that further development 
in the legal arena of online abuse is necessitated so as to find some neutral ground between 
the excesses of the criminal law and the luke warm, ambiguous and piecemeal involvement 
of the civil law, particularly when it comes to trivial information. 
 
Conclusions 
The use of Social Networking as a tool for knowledge communication is a growing trend
78
, 
but the development of means of communication throws into sharp relief the limitations of 
the law as a means of controlling, or even influencing, undesirable behaviour, given its 
limited influence on those engaging in such activities.  This is not least because those who 
make inappropriate online postings may not fully appreciate or be confused about whether 
what they are doing is against the law – particularly given the multitude of regulations that 
might apply to their activities.  The question is: can a legal tool address online abuse in a 
meaningful and effective way?  In order to begin to answer this question, this article has 
examined the reach of criminal and civil law tools following online abuse.  It may be 
summarised that the penalties under criminal law can be extremely harsh, particularly when 
much of what is written is trivial, whereas, by contrast, the common law remedies which can 
be awarded largely fail to have real impact.  In respect of the latter, enforcement itself is 
problematic because individuals may not only need to bring to account faceless, anonymous 
communicators, but they have to pursue their own cause and not every aggrieved individual 
is inclined, or able, to do so.  
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A common principle of both arms of law considered in this article is that there is a lack of 
clarity about the scope of acceptable disclosure, particularly in relation to the posting of 
trivial information, which causes individuals to be ill-informed about the law and causes 
judges to misinterpret online commentary. The result is one of fragmentation rather than a 
coherent body of law founded on clear and appropriate principles fit for the purposes of 21
st
 
century communications. The present legal landscape attaching to online communications is, 
therefore, ill-judged, ineffective and confusing.  However, the law can be made meaningful 
and effective and, in pursuit of this outcome, various recommendations follow, each of which 
is built on the premise that the law is rightly confined to only the most serious cases.  
 
As far as the criminal law is concerned, there are clearly instances where criminal sanctions 
are appropriate. However, the remit of criminal sanction must not be too overbearing and 
stifling of free speech. Cases like Chambers fall short of the requisite balancing act that 
criminal regulation must achieve if it is to offer protection without being too oppressive. As 
the European Court of Human Rights has reiterated throughout its body of case law
79
 ever 
since its landmark 1976 Handyside judgment
80
, freedom of expression protects not only 
“favourable” expression but also that which “shocks, offends or disturbs”. We suggest that a 
nuanced approach is called for in which allowance is made for assessing how ‘credible’ 
threats are in varied contexts of online communication and according to contemporary 
societal standards – effectively an attempt to guide the rising generation of users of social 
media
81
. We suggest that the old fragmented approach should be abandoned in favour of a 
more coherent set of offences which are designed specifically for social media rather than 
being adapted from existing laws designed for different circumstances. They should take into 
account the ways in which the medium is used: writing a letter is a very different form of 
activity to tweeting, for example. Such offences should also take account of the type of user: 
users of a platform such as Facebook, for example, are more likely to be younger rather than 
older people.  
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Additionally, we envisage an increased role for the civil law to deal with the lower level of 
inappropriate communications in order to avoid such communications being beyond the reach 
of the law. In order to address matters of clarity, this would involve the creation of a specific 
civil wrong underpinned by statute. One of the major benefits of a new and independent tort 
is that it would both allow for a more structured decision-making framework, which would 
assist a court in assessing when information, even that which is trivial, is judged as 
intrinsically private
82
 and help to clarify the consequences of sharing private information.  
We envisage that the creation of a statutory tort would, therefore, assist in the identification 
and appreciation of what, in the light of evolving social tools and behaviours, might be 
regarded as private and covered by legislation.    
 
Whilst the details of such a tort are open to debate
83
 and are complicated by the fact that 
privacy does not lend itself to precise definition, it is possible to consider how private 
information might be demarcated based on academic authority.  In his future ideology of 
privacy protection in which “A statute is the best option”84, Raymond Wacks proposes an 
approach that seeks to ascertain what specific interests of the individual the law ought to 
protect
85
.   To this end, we apply the analysis of Wacks so as to identify what specific 
interests of the individual we think the law ought to protect and we use as our basis Wacks’ 
domestic scholarly taxonomy of such matters
86
.  This categorises information as sensitive or 
not based on the extent to which the collection and use of it holds a potential for serious harm 
to the individual.  The approach of Wacks, therefore, aligns with the notions of abuse which 
are a central theme of this article.  Wacks determined that, inter alia, medical history, sex life, 
political opinions and criminal convictions constituted highly sensitive information and were 
therefore deserving of privacy protection. By contrast, an individual’s name and address 
represented information of low sensitivity and was, therefore, not deserving of privacy 
protection
87
.  
On analysis of the taxonomy developed by Wacks, it is possible to argue that there would be 
                                                          
82
 Warby, M, Moreham, N and Christie, I (eds) and Tugendhat, Hon M (Consultant Editor), The Law of Privacy 
and The Media (2
nd
 edition, Oxford University Press, 2011), at p. 235. 
83
 The problems of structuring a tort of privacy were addressed at length in Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62 
(CA), 70.  See, further, Moreham, N, ‘Privacy in the common law: a doctrinal and theoretical analysis’ (2005) 
121 Law Quarterly Review 628, 653. 
84
 Wacks, R, “Privacy and Media Freedoms” (OUP 2013) 256. 
85
 ibid 245. 
86
 Wacks, R, Personal Information: Privacy and the Law (Clarendon Press, 1989). 
87
 ibid 230. 
Page 19 of 21 
 
no private information in one’s date of birth and, on this basis, one may challenge the finding 
in the alternative in Applause Stores.  Wacks’ taxonomy therefore provides a means by which 
one could assess the types of information that might be regarded as private in nature, 
including trivial information (even though Wacks asserts that trivial or innocuous information 
would fall outside the law’s aegis88), and it does so based on a pragmatic approach. However, 
Wacks’ taxonomy is not devoid of problems, not least because it lacks sufficient subjectivity.  
By way of example, an address may have the potential for serious harm for someone who is 
building a new life away from a partner who has inflicted domestic abuse, which does not sit 
comfortably with its (low sensitivity) categorisation within the taxonomy
89
. Moreham argues 
that, since Wacks provides no way of working out what “intimate” or “sensitive” means, his 
taxonomy simply replaces the word “private” with two concepts which are equally difficult to 
define
90
, though these could be simply interpreted as ordinary English words.  Wacks himself 
recognizes that the classification may be in need of refinement and is, therefore, neither 
definitive nor complete
91
. Further, as Solove notes, any taxonomy is an attempt at 
categorization and all attempts at categorization are artificial
92
 particularly given that, in the 
future, new technologies and ways of living will create new privacy problems and transform 
old ones
93
, making any contribution dated.  Hence, any privacy tort would have to keep pace 
with developments in society and the evolving perceptions of privacy applied by individuals. 
It will, however, also need to be malleable enough to remain stable and useful without being 
unnecessarily broad and uncertain
94
. It would, moreover, require the identification of a 
moving target and attempting to identify foreseeable future infringements of privacy is, 
therefore, extremely problematic. Accordingly, as Eady has argued extra-judicially, “it would 
be wholly impractical to descend to the level of micro-management and to anticipate every 
situation that is likely to come before the courts. One never ceases to be amazed by the 
extraordinary range of scenarios that present themselves. No legislator could possibly think 
them up in advance”95.  Similarly, since we also lack the language for the technological 
future, the technical complexity and pace of change is so great that the structuring of a 
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statutory tort would require to be drafted at a level of generality that would still require some 
degree of judicial intervention to resolve disputes
96
.  Nonetheless, the type of demarcation 
that could be envisaged based on Wacks’ taxonomy might make a positive impact at 
addressing the uncertainty that particularly surrounds trivial information. 
Whilst the threshold for what might constitute private information would need to be 
determined on the basis of consultation, it might arguably fall below the current threshold of 
the criminal law.  Given the lower level of legal intervention, this might catch those who may 
be on the road to more seriously inappropriate conduct and might also cause individuals to 
think about what they send or post in future.  The lower threshold and lower standard of proof 
would enable individuals to be brought within the system without the need for criminal 
proceedings, without the consequences attaching to a criminal conviction and without the 
intervention of the police.  
 
In keeping with other areas of the civil law, in which enforcement is in the hands of bodies 
such as local authorities, we consider that a body specifically charged with enforcement 
should be established
97
 and that, rather than an award of compensation, individuals should be 
required to attend a course designed to educate them as to appropriate usage
98
. This would go 
some way to meeting one of the major issues relating to the use of social media, namely the 
idea that anything can be posted on the internet with impunity, as such a course would alert 
users to the possible consequences of inappropriate posting.  This proposal will therefore 
educate the public about the value of privacy and this is considered an important part of 
crafting a regulatory solution that ensures privacy becomes a public good for online users
99
. 
 
The criminal law or (virtually) nothing approach that characterises the current state of the law 
only deals with the extremes of acceptable or very unacceptable. Inserting something into the 
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middle ground could have beneficial effects, even if only marginally, given the peripheral 
influence of the law in this area. Nevertheless, we believe it is an avenue worth exploring.      
 
As Lord Justice Leveson has articulated in relation to online communications, “the question 
for us all [is].. to ensure that the criminal and civil law remain effective”100. Essentially, then, 
a more nuanced approach aimed at raising public and individual awareness may help in the 
identification and appreciation of what, in the light of evolving social tools and online 
behaviours, might be regarded as rightly incurring legal responsibility. This, we argue, can be 
achieved by putting in to effect the practical suggestions detailed above, which, by speaking 
to the contours, customs and practices of online communications, improve the applicability 
and usefulness of both criminal and civil law in the context of online communications. 
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